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RECENT DECISIONS
pose as breach becomes moot unless an opportunity to cure is afforded
the seller.3
Decisions like that of the instant case serve to give the Uniform Com-
mercial Code a desirable and commercially expedient flexibility by accom-
modating the interests of both buyer and seller in the commercial market-
place.
Daniel W. Cooper
WILLS-GENERAL POWERS OF APPOINTMENT-Exercise of a power by a
general bequest or devise in a will-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in applying Section 14(14) of the Wills Act of 1947 has clarified the law
by holding that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to prove a contrary
intent.
Jaekel Estate, 424 Pa. 433, 227 A.2d 851 (1967).*
The donor, through the provisions in his will gave the donee a legal life
estate in all his property and provided that the donee was to have a gen-
eral testamentary power of appointment over such property. There was
a gift over in default of appointment to a specifically named child of the
donor and donee. Subsequently, the donee died and her will provided that
the child was to receive the residue of the estate.
At distribution questions arose as to the assessment of the Federal
Estate tax liability and whether the Federal Estate Tax attached to the
property subject to the power of appointment.' These questions were
dependent upon whether or not the donee by will had exercised the power
of appointment. Under the provisions of Section 2041 (a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 if the donee of a general power of appointment
exercises the power, the value of the appointive property is included in
determining the value of the donee's estate for the purpose of computing
the Federal Estate Tax. If the power of appointment was not exercised
by the donee then the portion of the tax that would be computed on the
value of the appointive property would be avoided.' The Orphans Court
33. 228 A.2d at 849.
* Case research was aided by the electronic legal information retrieval techniques of the
Health Law Center, University of Pittsburgh.
1. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2041(a).
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2041 (a).
§ 2041. Powers of appointment
a. In general-the value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property.
1. Powers of appointment . . .- to the extent of any property with respect
to which a general power of appointment . . . is exercised by the de-
cedent-
(A) by will ...
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determined that the donee had not exercised the power of appointment.3
In arriving at its decision the Orphans Court indicated that Section
14(14) of the Wills Act of 19474 was applicable. Section 14(14) causes
a general bequest or devise to exercise a general power of appointment
in the absence of a contrary intent appearing in the will. However, ex-
trinsic evidence5 was admitted not for the purpose of furnishing the con-
trary intent, but for "the totally separate purpose of providing guidance
and assistance in ascertaining the real and accurate meaning intended
by . . . [the donee] . . . in the express and full subsisting and operable
testamentary phraseology which she did use."6
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Jones, re-
versed the Orphans Court and held that Section 14(14) of the Wills Act
of 19471 clearly indicates that the intent of the donee not to exercise a
power of appointment must appear in the will, and extrinsic evidence as
an aid in finding the contrary intent is not admissible. The court noted
that in Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Scott,' a situation which
was governed by Section 223 of the Wills Act of 1917,' the effect of the
statute could only be overcome by the presence in the will of language
clearly indicative of a contrary dispositive intent. The court also noted
the existence of several cases' ° in which extrinsic evidence had been con-
sidered in regard to a power of appointment. It appeared that a conflict
existed between this line of cases and Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia
3. Jaekel Estate, 15 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 350 (1965).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(14) (1947).
"In the absence of a contrary intent appearing therein, a will shall be construed
as a real and personal estate in accordance with the following rules:
(14) Power of appointment. A general devise of the real estate of the testator ....
shall be construed to include any real estate . . . , which he shall have power to
appoint in any manner he shall think proper, and shall operate as an execution of
such power. In like manner, a bequest of the personal estate of the testator, . . . ,
shall be construed to include any personal estate, . . . , which he shall have power to
appoint in any manner he shall think proper, and shall operate as an execution of
such power.
5. The extrinsic evidence was oral testimony of the scrivner to the effect that the donee
believed that nothing remained to be done in the donor's estate, that she, the donee, merely
had a life estate therein and, thereafter, everything belonged to the child; and the testimony
further pointed to the fact that the donee was very conscious of tax problems and expressed
a desire to adjust her affairs accordingly.
6. 15 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 360.
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(14) (1947).
8. 335 Pa. 231, 6 A.2d 814 (1939).
9. Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 403, § 11 (repealed 1947). Section 14(14) of the Wills Act
1947 is substantially a re-enactment of Section 223 of the Wills Act of 1917.
10. South's Estate, 248 Pa. 165, 93 A. 954 (1915). Thompson v. Wanamaker's Trustee,
268 Pa. 203, 110 A. 770 (1920). Jackson's Estate, 337 Pa. 561, 12A.2d 338 (1940). Rusk
Estate, 6 Chester Co. Rep. 188 (1954).
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v. Scott." As a result of this conflict the court felt that a guideline should
be established to govern the consideration of extrinsic evidence. Only
Rush Estate'2 of the cases which the court cited as permitting extrinsic
evidence, dealt with a situation similar to the instant case. In Rush, the
Orphans Court allowed evidence by the scrivner and the husband of the
testatrix, of the testatrix's belief that she was not a donee of any power
of appointment, that her son would automatically receive the property
which constituted the trust, and that it was her purpose to treat her
husband and son equally. The supreme court in the instant case criticized
the consideration of this evidence and stated, "If Rush Estate is correct
then the extent to which extrinsic evidence is admissible to show a 'con-
trary intent' would appear to be limitless."13
Aside from Rush Estate4 no other Pennsylvania case in which the
pertinent section of the Wills Act was involved permitted the admission
of extrinsic evidence for the purpose of providing or helping to provide
the contrary intent. The other cases recognized by the court involved the
consideration of extrinsic evidence as an aid in sustaining the effect of
the operation of the Wills Act.' In South's Estate'6 the court was faced
with a situation where the donee of a general testamentary power of
appointment over a ten thousand dollar fund left a will in which he gave
legacies amounting to ten thousand two dollars. The will contained no
residuary clause and made no reference to the power. Testimony was
received in which it appeared that there was no estate irrespective of the
ten thousand dollar fund and that the donee believed he possessed the
ten thousand dollars. The court considered these circumstances and held
that the donee had intended to exercise the power of appointment. Thomp-
son v. Wanamaker's Trustee 7 involved a testator who, during his life-
time, placed all his realty in a trust of which he was the life beneficiary.
He reserved in himself a general testamentary power of appointment and
provided that in case of default the realty would go to his children or
to issue of his children. He also had established during his lifetime, a fund
of securities for his son. The testator's will provided that only a small
portion of his residuary estate would go to his son. The will stated that
this was done because the testator was making ample provision for his
son during his lifetime. It was contended by the son that this manifested
an intent not to exercise the power, but- to allow the property to go by
default. The court permitted evidence concerning the creation of the fund
11. 335 Pa. 231, 6 A.2d 814 (1939).
12. 6 Chester Co. Rep. 188 (1954).
13. 424 Pa. at 442, 227 A.2d at 856.
14. 6 Chester Co. Rep. 188 (1954).
15. The extrinsic evidence considered in these cases was unnecessary in deciding that the
power of appointment had been exercised.
16. 248 Pa. 165, 93 A. 954 (1915).
17. 268 Pa. 203, 110, A. 770 (1920).
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of securities and stated that the fund was the ample provision the testator
had made for his son. The court held that the power of appointment had
been exercised and that the effect created by the Wills Act had not been
overcome. The court went on to say that the extrinsic evidence considered
was not used in rendering the decision.
The supreme court included Jackson's Estate18 in the group of cases
which considered extrinsic evidence. Jackson's Estate9 did not involve
the issue of exercise or non-exercise, but involved the question of whether
a donee, who had expressly exercised the power, intended to blend the
appointive property with her own property. The facts indicated the indi-
vidual estate of the testatrix was insufficient to pay the legacies provided
by the will. However, the testatrix had the power of appointment over
two trust funds, one created by herself. The residuary clause in the will
expressly exercised any powers of appointment and gave the residue to
individuals other than the legatees. The legatees contended the testatrix
had intended to blend her own property with the appointive property.
The court sustained this contention and considered evidence dehors the
will2" to support their decision.
Whether a power of appointment was exercised in the absence of an
express statement to that effect has been an issue which has faced a
number of courts. In the early days of the Commonwealth, and before
the passage of the Act of June 4, 1879, if a will was to be construed as
an exercise of a power of appointment, the intent of the donee to exercise
the power had to appear in the instrument. Three situations were recog-
nized which demonstrated the presence of this intent: (1) where there
was some reference to the power in the executing instrument; (2) where
there was a reference to the property which was the subject of the power;
(3) where the instrument of exercise would have no operation whatever,
except as an execution of the power.2 The mere presence in a will of a
general bequest or general devise was insufficient to exercise powers of
appointment.22 The general bequest or devise only operated to pass the
testator's property; since a power of appointment was not considered the
donee's property a general bequest or devise with nothing more was
insufficient.2a This reasoning, however, usually defeated the actual intent
18. 337 Pa. 561, 12 A.2d 338 (1940).
19. Id.
20. The evidence considered by the court was (1) the testatrix had created one of the
trust funds with her own money (2) the relationship of the testatrix to the legatees (3) the
testatrix own estate was insufficient to pay the legacies and (4) the testatrix gave no
instruction to the scrivener, who was not a member of the bar, from which fund the legacies
were to be paid.
21. Wetherell v. Wetherell, 18 Pa. 265 (1852). Bingham's Appeal, 64 Pa. 345 (1890).
22. Id.




of the testator-donee. As a result the legislature passed the Act of June 4,
187924 which specified that the presence of a general bequest or devise
would operate as an exercise of the power unless a contrary intent ap-
peared in the will. In other words, the 1879 Act created a rebuttable
presumption the purpose of which was to supply the common law require-
ment, that the intent to exercise a power of appointment be manifested
in the will. Moreover, the presumption continued to operate even when
the will had been executed prior to the creation of the power.25 Since the
Act created a presumption in favor of the exercise of a power of appoint-
ment the burden of producing evidence to the contrary was placed on the
party who asserts non-exercise and this burden can only be satisfied with
evidence contained in the instrument.26
Jaekel Estate27 reiterates this interpretation and eliminates any con-
fusion which existed concerning the admissibility of extrinsic evidence.
Section 14(14) of the Wills Act of 194728 creates a presumption in favor
of the exercise of a power of appointment by the will and dictates that
the source of an intent on the part of the donee of a power not to exercise
a power of appointment must be in the language and provisions of the
will.29
Paul E. Warburgh, Jr.
24. Act of June 4, 1879, P.L. 88.
25. Blackburn's Estate, 290 Pa. 55, 138 A. 538 (1927). Morris's Account, 298 Pa. 540,
148 A. 843 (1930).
26. Aubert's Appeal, 109 Pa. 447, 1 A. 336 (1885).
27. 424 Pa. 433, 227 A.2d 851 (1967).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 180.14(14) (1947).
29. The Pennsylvania courts in applying some of the other sub-sections of Section 14
of the Wills Act of 1947 or their predecessors have stated that any contrary intent must be
expressed in the will. See Kautz v. Kautz, 365 Pa. 450, 76 A.2d 398 (1950), (devises of real
estate) ; Metzgar Estate, 395 Pa. 322, 148 A.2d 895 (1959), (time of ascertaining a class);
Smith v. Piper, 231 Pa. 378, 80 Atl. 877 (1911), (meaning of "die without issue") ; Collins
Estate, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958), (adopted children).
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